

RETROSPECTIVE OSINT CASE STUDY, FULL REPORT

Could a background check have seen it coming?

Flydubai flight FZ1073, 30 September 2026

The co-pilot named in media reports as Hamam al-Hammami (همام الهمامي)

REPORT DATE	4 October 2026
INFORMATION AS OF	4 October 2026
PURPOSE	Case study for employers in aviation, security and critical infrastructure, and HR
PREPARED BY	ProfCheck

Prepared from public sources only. The person discussed is a suspect. He has not been charged in court or convicted, and as of the date above no authority has officially confirmed his identity.

1. The answer in brief

On 30 September 2026 the co-pilot of Flydubai flight FZ1073 from Dubai to Tel Aviv attacked the captain in the cockpit and tried to take the controls [1][2]. Within three days, media reports named him and described a history of extremist views [3][4][5]. This review asks a narrow question: **was there public online information, before the act, that carried signs of radicalization, and could a background check have found it?**

We fixed the list of indicators before searching. We tested two dates: when Flydubai hired him (February 2026, according to the Wall Street Journal [6]) and the day of the attack. We then ran 28 Google searches limited to pages dated before the hiring date, to see what a check run at the time would have returned. We read the findings through two lenses: the published frameworks for violent radicalization, and ProfCheck's own method, which marks negative behavioural indicators.

QUESTION	AT HIRING BY FLYDUBAI (EARLY 2026)	ON THE DAY OF THE ATTACK (30 SEPTEMBER 2026)
Did public online material exist?	Yes. A deleted X account with about 3,000 of his tweets from 2021 and 2022, preserved by the Internet Archive. A public mirror page that names him, archived in September 2024. Instagram and LinkedIn profiles.	The same. Nothing that was posted on Instagram or LinkedIn before the attack was preserved.
Could a reasonable check have found it?	Yes, with the right method. Only through his username, or his name in Arabic read with care, and then the archive. The 16 name searches we ran surfaced none of his pages.	The same.
Did it show signs of violent radicalization?	No. None of the pre-set indicators of violent radicalization.	No new public material was found. The violent material appeared about nine hours after the attack.
Did it carry ProfCheck's negative indicators?	Yes. Demeaning women, hostility to foreigners, imposing religious norms on others with support for violent punishment, and deliberate deception with fake identities. All archived in 2022.	The same.

The strongest warning signs reported so far were not online. They were Oman's removal of him from flight duties over extremist views or material [3][5][7], and an application to Royal Air Maroc that ended without a job [8][9], which his LinkedIn profile presented as seven months of employment [3]. These are facts that employment verification surfaces. An online check alone does not. According to a Gulf diplomat, the checks before he was hired focused on criminal convictions, not on signs of radicalization [10], and no one asked Oman about him [6].

Our conclusion. Under ProfCheck's method, the archived tweets carry four negative behavioural indicators. Together with the offline facts, a ProfCheck report at the hiring date would have given the employer clear grounds not to hire him as a pilot.

What this full report adds to the short version of 3 October:

- **A simulation of the check at the hiring date.** We ran 28 Google searches limited to pages dated before 30 December 2025 (section 10).
- **A theme profile of all 2,998 archived tweets, coded under ProfCheck's method** (section 6).
- **A second, still-live LinkedIn profile** (section 4).
- **A re-check of every use of the word "حماس".** In his tweets it means "enthusiasm" (section 6).

- **An assessment of claims that circulated after the event** (section 8).
- **Reporting up to 4 October:** what Flydubai checked, the crew list Israel received, and his years in Australia (sections 2 and 9).

2. The event and what is known

The event. Flight FZ1073 left Dubai for Tel Aviv on 30 September 2026. The co-pilot attacked the captain with the cockpit crash axe and tried to take the controls. Crew and passengers overpowered him, and the aircraft landed in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia, with 174 passengers and 8 crew [1][2][11]. The UAE Attorney General described the act as the start of a terrorist operation [1].

Identity. The official statements of Saudi Arabia and the UAE do not name him [1][11]. NBC and Al Jazeera reported that his identity had not been officially confirmed [2][12]. Media citing officials and diplomats named him as **Hamam al-Hammami**, a 29-year-old Omani citizen born in the UAE to an Omani father and a Syrian mother [3][4][13][14]. Arabic outlets spell the surname two ways [14][15]. His own accounts use **همام الهمامي** [16][17]. Flydubai has declined to comment while the investigation continues [18]. Reports differ on his age (29 or 30) and on how he left Oman Air: dismissed, resigned, or moved to a desk job [6][19][20].

Career, as reported

- **Oman Air.** About seven years, to February 2025, according to his LinkedIn profile [3]. While there, he was removed from flight duties and moved to an administrative role over extremist views or extremist material found in his possession; ABC dates this to 2024 [3][4][7]. The Wall Street Journal first reported that Oman had banned him from flying [5]. CBS reported that Omani monitoring found him visiting radical websites [20]. Oman has made no public statement [21].
- **Royal Air Maroc.** The airline says he completed a three-month theoretical training in 2025 as part of a pre-employment process, and his application was not selected [8][9]. His LinkedIn profile listed employment there from June 2025 to January 2026 [3].
- **Flydubai.** Hired in February 2026, according to the Wall Street Journal [6]; earlier reports put his tenure at eight to nine months [3][22][23][24]. A Gulf diplomat told AP that the checks before he was hired focused on criminal convictions rather than signs of radicalization [10]. CBS reported that he was hired without vetting with the Omani government [20], and people briefed on his background told the WSJ that Oman would have shared what it knew had it been asked [6].
- **Australia.** He studied in Australia from 2015 to 2017, according to Australian reporting. The Victorian Joint Counter Terrorism Team, which includes the AFP and ASIO, confirmed that it is investigating "the man's links to Australia" [25].

Israel. The Israel Tax Authority confirmed that it received the flight's crew list before departure [26]. Senior officials told ynet that crew data on foreign flights had not been examined for about two years [27]. Israel Hayom reported, citing his interrogation, that he had flown to Israel several times before [28].

Unverified claims are assessed in section 8.

3. How we checked

The question in three parts. For each of the two dates we asked separately: did the material **exist** publicly; would a reasonable check have **found** it; and would an analyst who did not know the outcome have **read it as a warning sign**. Keeping these apart is what prevents a review written after the fact from concluding that everything was obvious.

Indicators fixed in advance. Before the search started we wrote down the indicators to look for, and did not change them afterwards:

- **Mobilization Indicators, 2021 edition** (NCTC, FBI and DHS) [29], with its supplement for critical infrastructure [30]. We used the 16 indicators that an online footprint can show (section 11).
- **TRAP-18** [31], the threat-assessment protocol for lone actors, for its warning behaviours and background characteristics.
- The booklet itself warns that lawful religious or political expression is not, by itself, an indicator. It also warns that action must never rest on national origin, ethnicity or religion [30]. We coded what was observed, not what could be inferred.
- **ProfCheck's method** marks negative behavioural indicators that matter to any employer, whether or not they predict violence: demeaning attitudes toward women; hostility to foreigners; imposing religious norms on others and justifying violent punishment; and deliberate deception, including false identities. Religious practice and political opinion are not indicators in themselves; support for terror organisations or for BDS is.

Rules

- **Attribution.** An account is attributed to him only when at least two independent details match. Otherwise it is "an account bearing his name".
- **Proof of time.** An item counts as visible before a date only if the platform's own date is confirmed by an independent record: an archive capture or a dated reply by someone else.
- **Conduct.** Public sources only: no logins, no contact with any account, and no research on relatives.

Sources searched.

- English, Arabic and Hebrew media.
- The Wayback Machine and archive.today.
- The public pages of X, Instagram, TikTok, LinkedIn, Tellonym and mirror sites.
- The official sanctions lists of the US, UN, EU and UK.
- A manual review of Facebook.
- **The simulation:** 28 Google searches limited to pages dated before 30 December 2025, run through a commercial search interface [32].

Every keyword hit was read in context by an analyst.

4. His accounts, and how sure we are


PLATFORM	ACCOUNT	ATTRIBUTED?	BASIS	BEFORE THE ATTACK
X	@PilotHamam	HIGH	Arabic name and "civil pilot" in the bio from January 2022; describes himself as Omani, living in Muscat [33][34]; a tweet quoted by CNN matches an archived tweet word for word [3][35]; an OSINT researcher cited the same username [36]	About 3,000 tweets, November 2021 to October 2022, archived [37]
Rattibha (X mirror)	PilotHamam	HIGH	Title gives the Arabic name and the username [16]	Archived on 17 September 2024 [38]

PLATFORM	ACCOUNT	ATTRIBUTED?	BASIS	BEFORE THE ATTACK
Tellonym	piloathamam	HIGH	Linked from the X bio [16]	Archived January 2022; only two questions survive [39]
Instagram	@piloathamam	MEDIUM	Arabic name, bio "civil pilot ... airline pilot", 6 posts, about 300 followers, as indexed by Google [17][32]; CNN tied it to the post-attack videos [3]	Deleted; never archived
TikTok	@piloathamam	MEDIUM	Same username, name "Pilot Hamam", cockpit photo [40]	Opened October 2022, no videos
LinkedIn (1)	hamam-al-hammami-974932299	MEDIUM	CNN and one source [3][36]	Deleted; no capture from before the attack [41]
LinkedIn (2)	hamam-al-hammami-7270b6344	MEDIUM	Headline "Senior First Officer @ Oman Air", indexed by Google; the same headline appears in screenshots published by the media [42]	Still live on 4 October 2026, behind sign-in
Facebook	one profile, similar name	LOW	Name only; not attributed [43]	One post from 2017, no relevant content

People who are not him.

- **Search results.** A search of the name in English or Arabic is dominated by a Saudi footballer of the same name, born 2004 [44][45].
- **Sanctions lists.** They return Omar Hammami, an American member of al-Shabaab born in 1984, and another designated man named Hamami [46][47]. Neither is the subject.
- **Other namesakes.** The simulation also surfaced a Syrian medical student and a Saudi footballer, both named "Humam Al-Hammami" [32].

A screening tool that matches on surname alone would raise a false alarm here, and would still miss the real person.



The TikTok account @piloathamam ("Pilot Hamam") on 3 October 2026: opened October 2022, no videos, a profile photo taken in the cockpit of a light aircraft [40].

5. Timeline

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	PUBLIC ONLINE TRACE
2015	Goes abroad on a government scholarship, aged 18; in Australia until 2017, then the UK and New Zealand, by his own account	His own tweets [48]; Australian reporting [25]
27 Nov 2021	Opens @PilotHamam on X	Archived from the next day [37]
Jan to Mar 2022	Most active period, about 700 tweets a month	Archived within minutes of posting
Sep to Oct 2022	Deletes almost all his tweets: live count falls from 1,787 to 8	Archived counters [49][50]
Oct 2022	Opens an empty TikTok account	Live [40]
11 Oct 2023	Films El Al aircraft from a cockpit in Dubai, four days after 7 October	Published only after the attack [3]
2024 or 2025	Removed from flight duties at Oman Air over extremist views or material	None; reported in October 2026 [5][7]
17 Sep 2024	Mirror page with his name and username captured by the Wayback Machine	Archived [38]
Feb 2025	Leaves Oman Air	LinkedIn [3]
2025	Three months of pre-employment training at Royal Air Maroc; not hired	Airline statement in October 2026 [8]

DATE	WHAT HAPPENED	PUBLIC ONLINE TRACE
Feb 2026	Joins Flydubai, after checks that reportedly focused on criminal convictions	Reported [6][10]
30 Sep 2026	The attack on FZ1073	
About 9 hours later	Two posts with al-Qaeda imagery on LinkedIn and Instagram	Reported by CNN; since deleted [3]

6. What was public before the attack: the X account

The account

- **Identity and stated profile.** @PilotHamam was opened on 27 November 2021. From January 2022 the bio read "Hamam al-Hamami, civil pilot", and later "my tweets are my personal opinion only", followed by "no politics" [16].
- **What survived.** The Wayback Machine captured 2,998 of his tweets between 28 November 2021 and 29 October 2022. Half of them were captured within five minutes of posting [37].
- **Volume.** About 700 tweets a month from January to March 2022, then between 50 and 240 a month until September.
- **Language and form.** About 95 percent of the tweets are in Arabic, and about 97 percent are replies, mostly on Gulf advice and confession accounts.
- **The deletions.** Between 17 September and 29 October 2022 the live count of tweets on the account fell from 1,787 to 8 [49][50], and X now marks the posts as deleted by their author [51].

At the hiring date, the account was already empty. Its content had survived only in the archive for more than three years. When the account itself was closed is unknown; it was gone by 2 October 2026 [52].

What he wrote about. A count of keyword groups across the 2,998 tweets, with every hit in the sensitive groups read by an analyst:

THEME	TWEETS	WHAT THEY CONTAIN
Women, modesty, mixed workplaces, feminism	179	Demeaning and controlling views; the largest group by far
Politics, the Muslim world, the West	80	Comparisons of the West, Russia and the Gulf, mostly about women and marriage; no call to action
Gulf states and their governments	79	Saudi women, foreign workers, his search for a Saudi wife in a niqab; hostility to men from the Levant
Unbelief, apostasy, "infidels"	10	Insults in arguments ("you sound like an atheist"); no call to harm anyone
Death and the afterlife	11	Condolences and religious advice
Cockpit, captain, co-pilot	10	Ordinary pilot talk
Violence words (killing, jihad)	16	Crime stories, martial-arts training, "killing a soul is forbidden", "struggle against oneself"
Jews, Israel, Palestinians	7	"Palestinian" only as a nationality in complaints about foreign men
Jihadist groups or figures	2	Both are the word "حماس" meaning "enthusiasm" (below)

Examples, translated literally from Gulf Arabic:

- 1 January 2022: "The beauty of the Saudi woman is in her chastity, her niqab and her modesty. As for these, [they are] cheap meat, torn at by the worthy and the worthless." [53]
- 5 January 2022: "How many respectable and religious girls have been ruined in mixed workplaces and played with." [54]
- 2 February 2022, on his mother's search for a wife who would wear the niqab and stop working: "They all refused. Then my mother told them my son is a pilot, and they all agreed." [35] CNN quoted this tweet

[3].

- 13 January 2022, on a five-year sentence for a man who blackmailed women: he cites the Quranic punishment for highway robbers ("that they be killed or crucified, or their hands and feet cut off") and asks what then a man who violates women's honour deserves [55].
- 21 February 2022, recalling 2015: he walked up to two British women in swimwear on a Gulf beach and told them their clothing was "unacceptable" [56].
- 3 March 2022, a joke about a husband: "He gave her a pre-emptive slap so she would redraw her borders, the way Russia slapped Ukraine to adjust its borders :)" [57]



Archived on 2 February 2022: the profile panel (name, bio, link to Tellyonym, "civil pilot", joined November 2021) and the tweet that CNN later quoted. The time on the page is US Pacific; the tweet was posted at 19:59 UTC [35].



The Wayback Machine capture of 1 January 2022 (archive toolbar at the top) of the tweet on Saudi women and "cheap meat". The time on the page is US Pacific; the tweet was posted at 06:59 UTC on 1 January 2022. Posts by other users in the thread are cropped out [53].

Fake identities. In January 2022 he described, more than once, opening fake accounts that posed as a man from the Levant, with another man's photo, to message Saudi women and "test" them; he also advised others to do the same [58][59]. For an employer this is an integrity finding: deliberate deception, aimed at women. It is not an indicator of violence.

What he did not write.

- **Israel and Jews.** Nothing about Israel or Jews.
- **Palestinians.** When another user wrote that Palestinians are "the filthiest of God's creation", he answered: "There are good people among them; if you see a few fools, it does not mean they are all like that" [60].
- **Politics.** His bio announced "no politics" [16].

How it codes

- **NCTC:** none of the 16 indicators of mobilization to violence. The tweets name no violent extremist group or figure and praise no attacker. They contain no threat and name no target.
- **TRAP-18:** at most one weak background characteristic, moral outrage.
- **ProfCheck's method: four negative indicators**, all public and archived in 2022, more than three years before the hiring:

NEGATIVE INDICATOR	EXAMPLES FROM THE ARCHIVE
Demeaning attitudes toward women	Women as "cheap meat" [53]; a joke approving a slap, and "he would stomp on her head" [57]; a wife must wear the niqab and not work [35]; the largest theme in the account
Hostility to foreigners	"Wherever Syrians spread, every kind of corruption spreads" [61]; men from the Levant "would suck the Saudi's blood" [62]
Imposing religious norms on others; justifying violent punishment	Confronting two strangers on a beach over their swimwear [56]; the Quranic punishment "killed or crucified" proposed for a blackmailer [55]
Deliberate deception, false identity	Fake accounts with another man's photo to "test" women, and advice to others to do the same [58][59]

What a reader should conclude. These are not predictions of an attack. They are findings about how a candidate treats women, people of other nationalities and the truth. For a pilot, who works in a crew and carries passengers of every origin, each of them matters. They are also the findings that call for a deeper check, and here a deeper check would have reached the removal from flight duties.

The keyword trap. A scan of the 2,998 tweets for violence, jihadist groups, Jews and Israel returned dozens of hits. Read in context, none of them was relevant.

The word "حماس". It appears in his own tweets exactly twice. Both are on 27 January 2022, both under a video of paragliding whose author wrote of "joy and enthusiasm (وحماسة)": "ما شاء الله" and "ما حماس.. ما شاء الله" [63][64]. Here the word means "enthusiasm", not the organisation. No tweet mentions Qassam, Gaza, Sinwar, Haniyeh, "the resistance" or al-Aqsa.

Other false hits. "هنية" matched inside "المهنية" (professional), and "قسام" inside "انقسامات" (divisions). Sanctions screening on the surname returns a designated al-Shabaab member who is someone else.

Automated filters flag words. Only an analyst who reads the language decides what they mean.

This holds for the archived X account of 2021 and 2022. Israel Hayom reported, without naming a platform or a date, that he posted pro-Hamas material (section 8). That claim is outside what the archive can confirm or rule out.

The hindsight trap. Three archived tweets read differently today than when they were written.

On 22 May 2022 another user wrote to him "may the plane crash with you" over his posts about women. He answered: "I usually have 180 passengers with me, and the captain and the cabin crew; strange that your hatred of me makes you wish death on all these people" [65].

On 13 January 2022 he told a woman that fear of death shows a weak relationship with God, and advised her to listen to lectures about paradise [66].

On 2 February 2022 he advised a young man to take up boxing and Muay Thai, writing that the training had calmed his own temper [67].

Read after 30 September 2026, all three sound ominous. In their context, the first is a pilot objecting to a curse on his flight, the second is common religious advice, and the third is fitness advice. This is why the indicators were fixed before the search.

7. What appeared only after the attack

The two posts. About nine hours after the attack, two posts appeared on the LinkedIn profile, and the same videos on the Instagram account [3]:

- **The first post** is a compilation of clips filmed in a Boeing 737 MAX cockpit. One clip, dated 11 October 2023, zooms in on an El Al aircraft at Dubai airport; other clips show more El Al aircraft and an Arkia aircraft. The video ends with photos of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and of Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, who killed nine people, seven of them CIA officers and contractors, in a 2009 suicide bombing in Afghanistan [3].
- **The second post** is an AI image linking Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, with a 19th-century nationalist poem by the Egyptian poet Mahmoud Sami al-Baroudi about not fearing death [3][6].

After the attack, an al-Qaeda publication praised him and called for copycat attacks on aircraft [68].

CNN wrote that it is unclear who published the posts or whether they were scheduled [3]. These posts are the "video glorifying a suicide bomber" in Hebrew-language reports [69][70][71].

Why they do not count. By content, these posts match NCTC indicators 15 (surveilling targets), 32 (promoting violent extremist content) and 36 (praising an attacker). But they were published after the act, so no check could have seen them. The footage itself was filmed in October 2023, and we found no evidence that it was published anywhere before 30 September 2026. The Instagram account was never archived, and LinkedIn has no capture from before the attack [17][41][72][73].

8. Claims that circulated after the event

Within days, claims about him spread in the media and on social networks. We assessed each one by the same rules: is there a source, is there a date, and is it an indicator or an association.

CLAIM	SOURCE	ASSESSMENT
He "discussed killing Jews on social media"	An unnamed Israeli official to The Times of Israel [74]	Not verified. No platform, account or date was given, and nothing like it is in the archived X account. If such posts exist, they were likely posted after October 2022 or in private channels

CLAIM	SOURCE	ASSESSMENT
He posted "pro-Palestinian, pro-Hamas and anti-Israel material" and "content supporting suicide attacks"	Sources familiar with the investigation, to Israel Hayom [75]	Not verified. No platform, account or date. Not in the archived X account of 2021 and 2022. If confirmed with a date before the hiring, it would match NCTC indicators 32 and 36
Leaflets of "Free Palestine" groups among his belongings at the airline; statements hostile to Israel	One unnamed Emirati source, via Arutz Sheva [76]	Workplace, not online, and a single source. Political material is not by itself an indicator; hostile statements at work are for the employer's security and HR to record
He was under the influence of extremist preachers	A preliminary intelligence report cited by Israel Hayom [77]	Not verifiable from public sources
He refused to shake hands with women and prayed throughout the day	A fellow pilot, via The Times of Israel [24]	Workplace behaviour, not online. Consistent with the views in his tweets; not an indicator of violence
A LinkedIn card "HAMAM AL HAMMAMI, Oman Air, 3 followers"	Circulating image [78]	Consistent with the live LinkedIn profile 7270b6344 [42]. Shows a small network; no indicator
A Facebook profile "Hammam Alhamami" with a raised fist over a Palestinian flag	Circulating image [78]	Not found by a manual search on 4 October 2026; its authenticity and its owner are unknown. Even if authentic and his, a flag with a fist is political expression, not one of the indicators
"His family identifies with the Palestinian struggle"	Commentary in the same image [78]	Outside the scope. This review does not research relatives, and a political sympathy is not an indicator
"His mother is from Syria, a former ISIS base, and he visited often"	Commentary in the same image [78]; time in Syria also reported by Al Arabiya [13]	The visits are true; the conclusion is an association. He wrote in January 2022 that he often visited Syria [79]. Visiting family is not an indicator, and the NCTC guidance warns against action based on national origin [30]

For a client, this section matters as much as the findings. After a high-profile event, images of unknown origin and claims built on family, nationality or religion spread faster than verified facts. A background check that adopts them exposes the employer to error and to discrimination claims. Here, two of the circulating items could not be traced to any account at all.

9. Where the warning signs actually were

SIGNAL	WHERE IT WAS	COULD A CHECK REACH IT?
Removed from flight duties at Oman Air over extremist views or material [3][5][7]	Records of the employer and of Omani authorities	Through employment verification, if the former employer discloses the reason for the change of role
Royal Air Maroc: training only, application not selected; LinkedIn claimed seven months of employment [3][8][9]	Employer statement versus his own profile	Yes. A gap between a profile and an employer's answer is a standard verification finding

SIGNAL	WHERE IT WAS	COULD A CHECK REACH IT?
Colleague testimony on behaviour toward women [24]	Workplace behaviour	Not online. A matter for reference interviews and internal reporting
Influence of extremist preachers [77]; years spent in Syria [13]	Intelligence reporting; personal history	Not through public sources
Checks before the Flydubai hiring focused on criminal convictions [10]; no one asked Oman [6]	The hiring process	This is the gap. A criminal-record check is not a background check
Israel received the crew list with his name before departure; crew data had reportedly not been examined for two years [26][27]	Israeli authorities	A list that no one reads is not a control

Two background characteristics in TRAP-18 fit what was reported offline [31]. One is a **blocked career**: removal from flying, then rejection by another airline. The other is an **ideological frame**. Neither shows in the public online record.

10. Rewinding the search: what a check at hiring would have found

Method. We ran 28 Google searches through a commercial search interface, limited to pages dated on or before 29 December 2025, the day before the earliest possible start at Flydubai [32]. The queries copy what a background check does at four levels:

- **Name in English** (8 queries, with spelling variants);
- **Name in Arabic** (8 queries, with both spellings);
- **Username** (5 queries);
- **Searches inside social networks** (7 queries).

Appendix A lists every query and its result.

What came back.

KIND OF CHECK	QUERIES	HIS OWN PAGES FROM BEFORE THE HIRING DATE	WHAT FILLED THE RESULTS
Sanctions and terrorism lists, by name	4 lists	None	Namesakes, including a designated al-Shabaab member [46][47][80][81]
Name search in English	8	None	Articles about the attack wrongly dated before 2026; places named "Hamam al-..."; other people with the name
Name search in Arabic	8	None	The Saudi footballer; songs; articles about the attack. The name together with "al-Qaeda", "jihad" or "Jews" returned nothing
Search by username	5	Yes: Instagram (bio "civil pilot ... airline pilot") and the mirror page with his name and username	Unrelated pages for the rest
Searches inside social networks	7	Yes: LinkedIn, two profiles with "First Officer, Oman Air"	The footballer on X, Instagram and Facebook
Archive search (Wayback Machine)		Yes: about 3,000 tweets of demeaning views on women and strict conservatism; no indicator of violence [37]	
Employment verification		The removal from flight duties, if disclosed; the Royal Air Maroc rejection, which contradicts his profile [8]	



The Wayback Machine capture of 17 September 2024 of the Rattibha mirror page. The title reads "author of this thread: the pilot Hamam al-Hamami @PilotHamam", followed by his bio. This is the page that connects his Arabic name to his username [38].

What it shows.

- **Name searches failed, and the username worked.** None of the 16 name searches surfaced a page of his from before the hiring date. A search by username surfaced his accounts in the first results. The difficulty is getting to the username. It appears on the mirror page that carries his name in Arabic, and on his LinkedIn page. Both are within reach of an analyst who reads Arabic and checks every result, not of an automated name screen.
- **None of the searches surfaced content with an indicator of violence.** The negative behavioural indicators were in the archive, one step past the username.

The limits of rewinding a search engine. Google's date filter is not a time machine. Pages written after the attack showed up with old dates, because the page's address existed earlier. Pages deleted since, such as the Instagram account, could not show up at all. The table is therefore an approximation in both directions. The archive captures, which carry their own dates, are the firm part of the evidence.

11. The indicators, one by one

For each indicator fixed in advance: was it visible online before the hiring date, did it appear only after the attack, or was it reported offline.

INDICATOR	ONLINE BEFORE HIRING	ONLY AFTER THE ATTACK	REPORTED OFFLINE
NCTC 3: own martyrdom video or statement	No	Possibly: the poem about not fearing death [3]	
NCTC 5, 8: details of, or intent to commit, violence	No		Claimed, not verified [74]
NCTC 12, 34: justifying violence as necessary	No		
NCTC 15, 25: surveilling or researching targets	No	Yes: El Al footage filmed in October 2023 [3]	
NCTC 24: association with violent extremists	No		Claimed: influence of preachers [77]
NCTC 26: pursuing jobs with sensitive access	No		Hypothesis in Israeli reporting, not verified [77]
NCTC 32: promoting violent extremist content	No	Yes [3]	Extremist material found by Oman Air [7]; pro-Hamas material, reported without platform or date [75]
NCTC 33, 36: extremist imagery; praising attackers	No	Yes: Zawahiri and al-Balawi [3]	Content supporting suicide attacks, reported without platform or date [75]
NCTC 35, 40, 41: radicalizing others; rejecting nonviolent voices; hardening after a catalyst	No		

INDICATOR	ONLINE BEFORE HIRING	ONLY AFTER THE ATTACK	REPORTED OFFLINE
NCTC 7: goodbyes, post-death instructions	No		
TRAP-18 leakage, fixation, identification	No	Identification: yes, by the posts [3]	
TRAP-18 background: moral outrage	Weak: anger at mixed workplaces and foreign men		
TRAP-18 background: framed by an ideology	Strict religious conservatism, not a violent ideology		Extremist views, per Oman [5]
TRAP-18 background: thwarted occupational goals	No		Yes: removed from flying; rejected by Royal Air Maroc [7][8]

Summary. Every indicator of violent radicalization in this case is either post-event or offline. The online record before the hiring date carries none of them, but it does carry four of ProfCheck's negative behavioural indicators (section 6). Together with the offline facts, they gave clear grounds not to hire him.

12. Lessons for employers

1. **Search in the candidate's language, and by username.** For a candidate from an Arabic-speaking country, an English name search finds namesakes. Here the useful thread was the Arabic name, then the username.
2. **Treat archives as part of the check.** Deleted is not gone. About 3,000 deleted tweets were readable in the Internet Archive.
3. **Have every hit read in context by someone who reads the language.** Filters produced false alarms here again and again: a word that means "enthusiasm", parts of other words, and a surname shared with a sanctioned terrorist.
4. **Verify employment, and not only the dates.** Ask former employers about changes of role and the reason for leaving. Compare their answers with the CV and the LinkedIn profile. In this case, the clearest contradiction was between his profile and the statement of a former employer.
5. **Treat conduct as a finding, and keep association out.** Demeaning women, hostility to foreigners, imposing religious norms on others and deception are negative indicators in their own right, whether or not they predict violence. Family, nationality, religious practice and political opinion are not indicators at all. Here the conduct indicators were public in the archive, and they were reason enough for the deeper check that would have reached the removal from flight duties.
6. **Check again after hiring.** Public archives of X go dark after late 2022 for this account. People change. For roles with access to aircraft, sites or systems, a check at hiring is a starting point.

For aviation: a criminal-record check is not a background check; according to a Gulf diplomat, the checks before this hiring focused on convictions [10]. Ask the previous airline directly about flight status and any removal from flight duties, and treat a pilot moving between carriers in a short period as a reason to verify each step.

For security and critical infrastructure: combine the check at hiring with an insider-threat process. The signals here were spread across employers, colleagues and authorities, and no single source held them all. Israel held his name on the crew list before the flight [26], and reportedly no one had examined crew data for two years [27]. A list that no one reads is not a control.

For HR: build reference questions about conduct toward colleagues and about the reason for leaving, and record the answers. Do not act on images or claims that cannot be traced to a source.

13. Limits of this review

- **Sources.** Public sources only. No access to the investigation, to Omani or airline records, or to private messages.
- **Facts that may change.** His identity has not been officially confirmed, and the facts are as reported up to 4 October 2026. Later reporting may change parts of this picture.
- **Archive coverage.** Archived captures of the X account end in October 2022, so nothing he may have posted there later could be reviewed. The Instagram and LinkedIn content from before the attack was not preserved.
- **The simulation** approximates what Google returned before the hiring date; section 10 explains why it cannot reproduce it exactly.
- **Facebook** was reviewed manually and only as visible to a non-friend.
- **Hindsight.** The indicators were fixed before the search to limit hindsight bias. They cannot remove it.

- **What this document is not.** It makes no finding of guilt. It is not a hiring recommendation; ProfCheck reports describe findings and leave the decision to the employer.

About ProfCheck

ProfCheck runs OSINT background checks on candidates, employees, suppliers and business partners, from public and lawful sources only.

What a ProfCheck check covers

- Sanctions, blacklists, and links to terrorism or to BDS
- Indications of criminal activity
- Activity on social networks, including translation from Arabic with its cultural context
- Verification of contact details
- Gaps in employment history and contradictions between the CV and public records
- In the extended check, also financial problems and conflicts of interest

How we work

- **Every finding carries a link** that the client can open and verify.
- **Namesakes are separated explicitly.** A hit is attributed only on more than one matching detail.
- **Searches cover the candidate's languages and usernames**, and include archives of deleted content.
- **A finding is reported with its context and level of certainty.** The report does not recommend or disqualify; the decision stays with the employer.
- **Reports are delivered in Hebrew or English**, usually within three business days of receiving the full details.

Beyond the standard check: a focused social-media check, OSINT investigations by project, and workshops for recruiters and security officers.

ProfCheck | profcheck.co

Appendix A. The simulation queries

All queries were run on 4 October 2026 through SerpAPI's Google engine, limited to pages dated on or before 29 December 2025 [32]. "His pages" counts results that belong to him and existed before the hiring date.

#	KIND	QUERY	RESULTS	HIS PAGES	WHAT FILLED THE RESULTS
EN1	Name, English	"Hamam Al Hammami"	10	0	Articles about the attack with wrong old dates
EN2	Name, English	"Hamam Al Hammami" pilot	10	0	Articles about the attack; the footballer's encyclopedia entry
EN3	Name, English	"Hamam Al Hammami" "Oman Air"	0	0	No results
EN4	Name, English	"Hamam Alhammami"	9	0	Articles about the attack; the footballer
EN5	Name, English	"Hamam Al Hammami" pilot	9	0	Articles about the attack
EN6	Name, English	"Hamam Al Hamami"	8	0	Places named Hamam al-...; another person
EN7	Name, English	"Humam Al Hammami"	7	0	A Syrian medical student; a Saudi footballer
EN8	Name, English	"Hamam Al Hammami" extremist OR radical OR terror	10	0	Articles about the attack
AR1	Name, Arabic	"همام الهمامي"	9	0	The Saudi footballer only
AR2	Name, Arabic	"طيار همام الهمامي"	8	0	Articles about the attack
AR3	Name, Arabic	"الطيار همام الهمامي"	9	0	Articles about the attack
AR4	Name, Arabic	"همام الحمامي"	9	0	Articles about the attack
AR5	Name, Arabic	"طيار همام الحمامي"	9	0	A song titled 'Tair al-Hamami'
AR6	Name, Arabic	"الطيران العماني" "همام الهمامي"	10	0	Articles about the attack
AR7	Name, Arabic	"تويتر همام الهمامي"	8	0	The footballer; articles about the attack
AR8	Name, Arabic	"همام الهمامي" "القاعدة" OR "جهاد" OR "اليهود"	0	0	No results

#	KIND	QUERY	RESULTS	HIS PAGES	WHAT FILLED THE RESULTS
HD1	Username	"PilotHamam"	3	2	His Instagram (bio 'civil pilot ... airline pilot') and the Rattibha mirror page
HD2	Username	"piloathamam" instagram	0	0	No results
HD3	Username	"piloathamam" tiktok	0	0	No results
HD4	Username	"tellonym.me/piloathamam"	9	0	Other users' Tellonym pages
HD5	Username	site:rattibha.com PilotHamam	10	0	Unrelated pages: the engine ignored the site filter
SO1	Inside a network	site:linkedin.com "Hamam Al Hammami"	10	1	LinkedIn directory: 'HAMAM AL HAMMAMI, First Officer, Boeing 737, Oman Air'
SO2	Inside a network	site:linkedin.com "Hamam" "Oman Air" "First Officer"	1	1	His live LinkedIn profile: 'Senior First Officer @ Oman Air'
SO3	Inside a network	site:twitter.com PilotHamam	10	0	Unrelated pages: the engine ignored the site filter
SO4	Inside a network	site:x.com "همام الهمامي"	10	0	The footballer
SO5	Inside a network	site:instagram.com "همام الهمامي"	9	0	The footballer
SO6	Inside a network	site:facebook.com "Hamam Al Hammami"	1	0	The footballer's encyclopedia entry
SO7	Inside a network	site:facebook.com "Hamam Alhammami"	10	0	The footballer

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<https://www.israelhayom.co.il/news/defense/article/21534358>
- [78] Composite image circulating on social networks: a LinkedIn card, a Facebook profile 'Hammam Alhamami' and Hebrew commentary. unknown origin | image received 4 Oct 2026 | accessed 2026-10-03. The original publisher could not be established; held in the case file.
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B. Sources checked, no findings

Sources searched that returned no relevant record on the date shown. A no-findings result covers only that source, that query and that date.

- [21] [Oman News Agency, Civil Aviation Authority and Oman Air public channels](#). Government of Oman, Oman Air | official channels | accessed 2026-10-03. No statement naming him or addressing his reported removal from flight duties, as of 3 Oct 2026.
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- [45] Arabic-language web, news and X search for [همام الحمامي](#) and [همام الهمامي](#) before 30 Sep 2026. Google News, Bing, DuckDuckGo, X public pages | search | accessed 2026-10-03. Only post-event items and namesakes, chiefly a Saudi footballer of the same name.
- [46] [OFAC Specially Designated Nationals list and alternate names](#). US Treasury | sanctions list, screened 3 Oct 2026 | accessed 2026-10-03. No listing for the subject. Namesakes only: Omar Hammami (born 1984, Somalia program) and Brahim Ben Hedili Ben Mohamed Hamami (SDGT).
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- [73] Wayback Machine and archive.today: LinkedIn profile hamam-al-hammami-974932299 on all country hosts. Internet Archive, archive.today | archive search | accessed 2026-10-03. Captures exist only from 2 and 3 Oct 2026, and show a sign-in wall.
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- [81] [UK Sanctions List](#). FCDO | sanctions list, screened 3 Oct 2026 | accessed 2026-10-03. No listing for the subject. Namesake only: Omar Hammami (SOM0010).
<https://sanctionslist.fcdo.gov.uk/docs/UK-Sanctions-List.csv>

C. Sources checked, not accessible

Sources that could not be queried or retrieved (blocked, login or captcha, not publicly searchable). These are NOT 'no findings'; fallbacks tried are noted.

- [52] X account @PilotHamam after 29 Oct 2022. X | platform | accessed 2026-10-03. No archived capture after 29 Oct 2022; X search and profile history require a login. The account was gone by 2 Oct 2026; the date it was closed is unknown.
- [82] Facebook personal profiles, automated access. Facebook | platform | accessed 2026-10-03. Closed to automated access; reviewed manually instead (see the Facebook entry in part B).