

RETROSPECTIVE OSINT CASE STUDY, DEMO REPORT

What was publicly visible about the pilot banned from Israel?

The United Airlines pilot whom Israel's Transport Ministry barred from Israeli airspace, October 2026

Sina Amjadian (سینا امجدیان)

REPORT DATE	21 October 2026
INFORMATION AS OF	21 October 2026
PURPOSE	Demo report for airlines, employers in sensitive roles, and security officers
PREPARED BY	ProfCheck

Prepared from public sources only. The ban on the pilot is an administrative security decision. He has not been charged with any crime.

1. The answer in brief

On 21 October 2026, N12 (Israel) reported that the Transport Ministry had barred a United Airlines pilot from Israeli airspace. According to the report, the Diaspora Affairs Ministry passed on his details after monitoring that began after the FZ1073 incident, and relied on two posts on X published by other people. The ministry did not point to any post by the pilot himself ^[1]. This review answers two questions: **are the claims true according to what the pilot himself published, and would a background check have found it, before hiring or during employment?**

CLAIM IN THE REPORT	WHAT WE FOUND	CERTAINTY
Posted a video with a song praising Iran's missile attack on Tel Aviv	Verified. A story of 7 October 2025, saved to a highlight on his Instagram account, with the song "Boom, Boom, Tel Aviv". The story was removed after the exposure.	High
Supported the IRGC and Hezbollah	Partly verified. Two reposts on his account of videos praising IRGC missiles, one of them about Tel Aviv. The repost date is not known. Nothing was found on Hezbollah.	High for the reposts
Supported the Iranian regime	Verified. Negative finding and risk factor. From June 2025, in stories saved to his highlight: a Khamenei clip, a Zarif clip on building missiles, portraits of Khamenei at Azadi Tower, "against all the Pahlavi traitors, this is our flag", and a flag kiss captioned "it won't fall". Also reposts of tribute videos to Khamenei.	High
Supported the 7 October attack	Not found. No post mentions Hamas or 7 October. The claim rests only on the date of the story, and the person who made it wrote "In my view".	-
Previously flew for flydubai	Verified. About seven years at flydubai, about five of them as captain.	High

QUESTION	BEFORE HIRING (OCTOBER 2022)	DURING EMPLOYMENT (TO 20 OCTOBER 2026)
Was negative material publicly visible?	No. A consistent professional record. Content from Iran up to October 2022 is travel, landscapes and family, with no support for the regime.	Yes. From June 2025, support for the Iranian regime in stories saved to a highlight. From October 2025, the story with the song about Tel Aviv. Also reposts of IRGC and regime content, with unproven dates.
Would a reasonable check have found it?	Not applicable. A search by username reaches the account. A search by full name does not.	Only a check that opens highlights and reposts and listens to the audio. Google does not return them.
Would an analyst have recognised it as negative?	Not applicable.	Yes. The regime support is recognisable at once: Khamenei, "Pahlavi traitors", "it won't fall". The song is recognisable only by listening, because the on-screen text is only "Boom boom :)".

Our conclusion. A background check on the day of hiring, in November 2022, would not have found a negative indicator. The career he presented matches the records, and the account then held no content supporting the regime. The negative material began in June 2025, about two and a half years after hiring: support for the Iranian regime and its leader, and later the story with a song praising the missile attack on Tel Aviv. The material was saved to highlights on his profile and stayed visible for more than a year. Periodic monitoring of public sources that opens highlights and reposts and listens to audio would have found it. The findings would have given the employer clear grounds for clarification with the employee. They are not a recommendation and not a disqualification.

2. The report and the source of the claims

What N12 reported [1]. The Transport Ministry passed the information to the Mossad and Unit 760, which recommended not allowing him to arrive as aircrew. United confirmed in writing that it had received the directive. According to United, he has worked for the company since November 2022, holds no widebody type rating, and flies only within the United States and between the United States and Canada. According to the report, he probably lives in Dubai.

Where the claims came from. We traced the earliest source: an X thread by Babak Taghvaei of 15 October 2026 [2][3][4][5]. The three items in N12's report, "the Iranian regime, the IRGC and Hezbollah", are the three in his opening post. The two quotes in the report match the next two replies in the thread: the song about Tel Aviv, and "In my view" on 7 October. On 16 October, ShadowGraph Intelligence published a 20-slide series with the same material and further details [6][7]. The ministry's letter has not been published, so the match between the report and the posts is of medium certainty.

How we treated the claims. A third party's claim is a lead, not a finding. A finding was recorded only when we saw the item on his own account, or when a third party's capture could be tied to his account by evidence we checked ourselves.

3. How we checked

Two cut-off dates. C1 is 31 October 2022, the day before he joined United. C2 is 20 October 2026, the day before the report. For each item we asked three separate questions:

- did it **exist** publicly on that date;
- would a reasonable check have **found** it;
- would an analyst who did not know the outcome have **recognised it as negative**.

Two lenses, kept apart. The NCTC, FBI and DHS violent-extremism mobilisation indicators (2021 edition), only those visible online. And ProfCheck's method: its check domains and its four behavioural indicators. We fixed the list of indicators before the search.

Rules

- **Attribution.** An account is attributed to him only on two attributes, at least one of them not derived from the name. A handle built from the name is not a second attribute.
- **Not counted.** Iranian origin, nationality, religion, Persian language and culture, landscapes, sport and the Iranian national team are not counted as negative findings.
- **Counted.** Under ProfCheck's method, support for the Iranian regime counts as a negative finding and a risk factor. It is the regime of a state in armed conflict with Israel, and its military arm, the IRGC, is a

designated terrorist organisation. Also counted: support for a designated terrorist organisation or its operations, praise of an attack on a civilian population, antisemitic content and threats.

- **The line between the two.** An item counts as support for the regime when it praises the regime's leader, its forces or its war effort, or when the flag is shown as a symbol of loyalty to the regime and against its opponents. A flag at a sports event or a song about Iran as a homeland does not count.
- **Preservation.** Every item was saved locally with SHA-256 and UTC time as soon as it was found. The subject could delete content after the exposure, and that is what happened.
- **No contact.** No contact was made with the subject, United or the ministries. No action was taken on any account.

Scope. Five tracks in parallel: identity anchors, the source of the claims, his accounts, his employment history, and lists and simulation. On the Instagram account we checked 197 posts, 121 reposts and about 250 highlight items. Relevant videos were transcribed in Persian and English, and songs were identified. We also ran 24 Google searches limited to dates before each cut-off [8].

4. Identity and accounts

Three independent sources identify the person:

- **The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airmen register.** One person of that name. Airline Transport Pilot certificate (ATP), type ratings for the Boeing 737 and the Embraer 145, no widebody aircraft. City: Irvine, California [9].
- **LinkedIn.** "Airline Pilot". United, Los Angeles, from November 2022. flydubai, September 2015 to October 2022. ATP since May 2013 [10].
- **A post of 7 July 2021** by an Instagram page of Iranian aircrew: "Capt: Sina Amjadian, Flydubai, B737 MAX" [11]. This is the only item under his full name that was visible before hiring.

The Instagram account flywithsinaa is attributed to him with high certainty [12]:

- **The bio:** "B737 Captain ... IKA ❤️ LAX based". The account is verified, was opened in 2012, and has about 18,600 followers.
- **His posts retrace the career:** "Last flight" on the ERJ-145 in August 2015 [13], a flydubai crew post after the FZ981 crash in March 2016 [14], and "Captain as of today!" on 27 November 2017 [15].
- **The match:** the aircraft types match the FAA register, and the airlines and dates match LinkedIn.
- **The full name does not appear on the profile.** The display name is only "Sina". After the exposure, on 19 October 2026, he added to the "Iran" highlight a story captioned "Thank you for your attention to this matter, Captain Sina Amjadian" [16].

The X account with the same name was opened on the evening of 15 October 2026, after the accuser's posts [17]. In replies there he writes in the first person as the accused pilot, and tells readers to "search my handle @flywithsinaa on any social media platform" [18].

Other people with the same or a similar name were rejected: LinkedIn profiles of a teacher and of students in Iran, an Instagram account, a YouTube channel, a researcher, and people with the same surname and a different first name. The OFAC sanctions list includes a person with the same surname and a different first name, an Iranian law-enforcement official; he was also rejected [19].

5. The career, as presented and as recorded

PERIOD	EMPLOYER AND ROLE	SOURCES	CERTAINTY
To 2013	Training in the United States; ATP certificate May 2013	LinkedIn, FAA	Medium
About 2013/2014 to 08.2015	Chautauqua Airlines (Delta Connection), ERJ-145, first officer	His posts, EMB-145 type rating	Medium-high
09.2015 to 11.2017	flydubai, Boeing 737, first officer	His posts, LinkedIn	High
27.11.2017 to 10.2022	flydubai, Boeing 737 and 737 MAX, captain	The post "Captain as of today!"	High
11.2022 to date	United Airlines, Boeing 737, Los Angeles	United via N12, LinkedIn, FAA, the bio	High

The flydubai claim is verified, with a correction. The accusers wrote "seven years a flydubai captain" [6]. According to his own post, he was there about seven years, about five of them as captain [15].

Points for clarification, low weight:

- LinkedIn shows "Airline Captain" at flydubai from September 2015. According to his post, he became captain in November 2017. LinkedIn shows one title per job, so the gap is not necessarily a misrepresentation.
- His employment at the US regional airline does not appear on LinkedIn. This is an omission, not a contradiction.

The US hiring context. A US airline checks the pilot's FAA records and his employer records for the previous five years [20]. For a hire in November 2022, those five years covered only flydubai. None of these checks looks at social media.

6. The main finding: the story of 7 October 2025




The story as captured by the accuser and published on X on 15 October 2026: the date October 7, 2025, the caption "Boom boom :)" and the Las Vegas location tag. The highlight icon at the top: a Palestinian flag, and the cover "300 days of genocide in Gaza" [3].

What is seen. A 24-second video filmed from the driver's seat on the Las Vegas Strip at night. On screen: "Boom boom :)", a location tag and a speaker icon [3].

What is heard. We transcribed the audio. The song is "Boom, Boom, Tel Aviv". Tehran Times described it in June 2025 as the song played online alongside footage of Iranian missile strikes on Israel [21]. A line from the transcript: "Iranian missiles have your entire skyline lit". The transcript is a machine transcript, and two separate runs gave the same line.

Why the story is his, although the video itself shows no name and no face. The story was removed, so we did not see it ourselves. We built the attribution from three pieces of evidence we checked:

1. **The same highlight.** The accuser published two captures from the same highlight: the same icon, the same cover, the same verified badge. Both show four items in the progress bar [3].
2. **The neighbouring item is still there.** The second capture, of 27 September 2025, is item 3 of 4. The exact same video is today item 3 in the flywithsinaa highlight [22].
3. **The fourth item is missing.** On 21 October 2026 the highlight holds only three items. The item of 7 October 2025 is missing. The accuser wrote on 16 October that the pilot had deleted it [23].



Left: the capture published by the accuser. Right: the item of 27 September 2025 as it is today in the flywithsinaa highlight. Same caption, same scene, same position in the highlight [3][22].

Dates. The story was posted on 7 October 2025, according to the date Instagram shows in the capture. The accuser's capture was published on 15 October 2026, which is independent evidence that the item was visible before C2. The item was removed between 15 and 21 October 2026.

Coding. Praise of a missile attack on a city. Lens one: praising past attacks (NCTC indicator 36) and promoting content that glorifies violence (indicator 32). ProfCheck's method: social media, and support for the operations of a designated terrorist organisation. The strikes on Israel were carried out by the IRGC, designated a terrorist organisation by the United States in 2019, Canada in 2024 and the European Union in February 2026 [24][25][26][27].

What the story does not show. It mentions neither Hamas nor 7 October 2023. The link to the date rests on the story being posted on the second anniversary. That is the accuser's interpretation; he wrote "In my view" [4]. The claim of support for the 7 October attack is therefore not verified.

7. Reposts of IRGC content

The account's Reposts tab holds 121 items [28]. Two of them praise IRGC missiles:

- **"The pink missile".** A video by @mh_bashiry of 7 April 2026. Subtitles: "plov Tel Aviv with the pink missile", followed by a pink missile inscribed "in response to the request of a revolutionary little girl", with the caption "And as for the duty of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps forces, the pink missile :)" [29]. A small child appears at the start of the video, so the report does not show those frames.
- **"When the IRGC's missiles conquer the hearts of freedom-seekers around the world".** A video by @antrotv of 6 April 2026, about the launch of an Iranian drone toward "the occupied territories" marked "Revenge for Rachel Corrie" [30].



From the video he reposted: "And as for the duty of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps forces, the pink missile :)" [29].



From the second video he reposted: the banner "Revenge for Rachel Corrie" on an Iranian drone [30].

What this is and is not. These are reposts of content made by others, not his own words. We saw them ourselves on his account on 21 October 2026. Instagram does not show when an item was reposted, so it is not proven that they were visible before C2. They support the claim about the IRGC. Nothing on Hezbollah was found on any account.

8. Support for the Iranian regime

Under ProfCheck's method, support for the Iranian regime is a negative finding and a risk factor (section 3). The "Iran" highlight holds 92 items, from June 2021 to October 2026 [16]. We opened all of them. Up to October 2022 they show no support for the regime: travel, landscapes, food and family. Support for the regime begins in June 2025, during the war between Israel and Iran.

In stories he posted himself and saved to the highlight (dates as shown by Instagram):

DATE	WHAT IT SHOWS
19.06.2025	A video clip of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, from another account, captioned "Hadeaghal gheyrat irani dashte bashid" ("at least have Iranian pride")

DATE	WHAT IT SHOWS
19.06.2025	A clip of former foreign minister Zarif, captioned "now it is clear to everyone why we built missiles"
25.05.2026	A video from the Iranian channel SNN: the Islamic Republic flag standing in a burning city
27.06.2026	"Against all odds, against all the Pahlavi traitors, This is and will always be our flag"
04.07.2026	People carrying portraits of Khamenei down the steps of Azadi Tower, with a black heart and two flags
05.07.2026	He kisses the Islamic Republic flag, captioned "it won't fall". The video was also published as a post [31]



The story of 27 June 2026 in the "Iran" highlight: the Islamic Republic flag against "the Pahlavi traitors", that is, against the opposition to the regime [16].

In reposts (repost date not known) [28]: tribute videos to Khamenei ("A Quiet Force in Modern Iranian Politics", "the martyred leader of the revolution"), a video tagged "Labbayk ya Khamenei" ("Here I am, Khamenei"), "Iran Ain't Giving Up" tagged #ayatollahkhamenei, and videos tagged "Islamic Republic" with the caption "this flag will not fall".

Coding. Support for the regime's leader, its missile programme, and its flag as a symbol against the regime's opponents. The items have been visible on the profile since June 2025, more than a year before the report. They therefore answer the C2 question.

Not counted. Iranian origin, Persian language and poetry, landscapes and travel, support for the Iranian team at the World Cup, and condolences for a Mahan Air crew member killed in a strike on Tehran. The highlight with the Palestinian flag, with the cover "300 days of genocide in Gaza" and a demonstration tagged #freephalestine [22], and the post "From River To The Sea, Palestine Will Be Free" on X after the exposure [32], were recorded as political opinion and not counted.

9. Conduct after the exposure

On 15 October 2026, hours after the accuser's posts, he opened an X account and replied:

- "I show support for Iran, Palestine, and Epstein victims and I will continue to fly" [33].
- Sexual insults aimed at the accuser's mother, and a crude remark addressed to the FBI in Los Angeles [34].
- On 16 October, replying to another user, he called Iran's supreme leader "our leader" [35].

- He did not deny the story and did not refer to it. In the following days the story was removed from the highlight.

This conduct is not part of the two questions, because it comes after the exposure. It is relevant to an employer as the public conduct of an employee in a sensitive role.

10. What was checked and found clean

- **Sanctions and terrorism lists:** OFAC, the UN, the EU, the UK, Israel's National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing lists, and INTERPOL notices. On each list we also searched a control name that is on it, to confirm the search works [19][36][37][38][39][40][41].
- **Hezbollah, Hamas and 7 October:** a search of all captions, highlight titles, song titles and transcripts. Nothing was found.
- **The period before hiring:** every post and highlight item up to October 2022 was opened. None contains negative content.
- **TikTok:** no relevant content found [42].
- **Iranian airlines:** no employment with an Iranian airline was found.

11. Running the search backwards

We ran 12 Google searches twice: once limited to pages before 31 October 2022, and once to pages before 20 October 2026 [8]. Details in Appendix A.

- **The full name in English,** alone or with "pilot", "flydubai" or "United", returned no page of his before hiring. It returned LinkedIn's name directory and other people.
- **The name with "Iran"** returned, at both cut-offs, the 2021 post showing him as a flydubai captain. That anchors identity; it is not a finding.
- **The username flywithsinaa** returned the Instagram profile at both cut-offs. The difficulty is getting to it: the full name is not on the profile.
- **Before the report (C2),** the name search returned the allegation posts of 15 and 16 October 2026. It did not return the story or the reposts. Google does not index Instagram stories and reposts.

What this means for a check. A Google search by name would not have found the material. What found it: identifying the account by professional attributes (aircraft type, airlines, base), comparing it with the FAA register, and opening the highlights and reposts, including the audio.

12. The indicators, one by one

Violent-extremism mobilisation indicators (NCTC, 2021), only those visible online:

INDICATOR	BEFORE HIRING	DURING EMPLOYMENT
Threat or statement of intent to commit violence (8)	Not found	Not found
Implied association with violent extremists (24)	Not found	Not found
Promoting or consuming violent extremist content (32)	Not found	Present: the song about Tel Aviv; two reposts of IRGC content (date unproven)

INDICATOR	BEFORE HIRING	DURING EMPLOYMENT
Praising past attacks or attackers (36)	Not found	Present: the story of 7 October 2025
Attempting to radicalise others (35)	Not found	Not found
Hardened view after a catalysing event (41)	Not found	Not proven

The NCTC booklet warns that a single indicator, or lawful expression of religious or political opinion, does not by itself show mobilisation to violence. We found no sign of intent, planning or threat.

ProfCheck's method:

DOMAIN	BEFORE HIRING	DURING EMPLOYMENT
Sanctions and blacklists	Clean	Clean
Terrorism ties	Not found	Support for the operations of a designated terrorist organisation: the story and the reposts. Hezbollah and Hamas not found.
Support for the Iranian regime (risk factor)	Not found	Present from June 2025: Khamenei, the missile programme, the flag against "Pahlavi traitors"; and in reposts
Criminal activity	Not checked in this review	Not checked in this review
Social media, the four behavioural indicators	None	None. The replies after the exposure are crude, but none is one of the indicators.
Employment verification	Consistent, with a small title gap on LinkedIn	Consistent
Origin, nationality, religion, culture	Not counted	Not counted

13. Lessons for employers

- A check at hiring is a picture of one day.** On the day of hiring the record was clean. The negative material began about two and a half years later. In sensitive roles, such as pilots, the check should be repeated periodically.
- The evidence was in a story and in audio, not in text.** The screen said only "Boom boom :)". The song carried the content. A check that reads only captions, or relies on Google, would not have found it. Highlights and reposts need to be opened, transcribed, and songs identified.
- The account was not in his name.** A search by name did not reach it. Accounts need to be identified by professional attributes and compared with official records.
- Preserve at once.** The story was deleted within days of the exposure. The attribution was rebuilt only because a third party kept a capture and the neighbouring item stayed on the account.
- Separate origin from support for the regime.** Iranian origin, language, culture and sport were not counted. Support for the Iranian regime, its leader and its forces was counted, as was praise of attacks. This separation protects the employer from a claim of discrimination on grounds of origin.
- Claims online are leads.** Here some were verified (the song, flydubai, United), some were not supported by evidence (Hezbollah, 7 October), and one detail was inaccurate ("seven years a captain").

14. Limits of the review

- **The story itself** was examined through a third party's capture, not directly. The attribution rests on the comparison with the neighbouring item still on the account.
- **The transcript** is a machine transcript of a song. The song was identified from an outside source.
- **Repost dates** are not shown by Instagram. It is therefore not proven that the reposts were visible before the report.
- **Stories not saved to a highlight** disappear after 24 hours and were not examined [43].
- **Not examined:** the personal Facebook profile, which is closed to automated access [44], and LinkedIn activity: posts, comments and likes [45].
- **Not accessible:** the Diaspora Affairs Ministry's letter, and the licence register of the UAE civil aviation authority [46].
- **Facts about the decision** come from the news report only. What else the security officials relied on is not known.
- **Date of the review.** The information is correct as of 21 October 2026.

About ProfCheck

ProfCheck carries out OSINT-based background checks on candidates, employees, suppliers and business partners, from public and lawful sources only. Our previous case study dealt with the FZ1073 incident, after which the monitoring that led to this ban began [\[47\]](#).

What a ProfCheck check covers

- Blacklists and sanctions, and ties to terrorism or BDS
- Indications of criminal activity
- Social media activity, including saved stories, reposts and audio transcription, in Hebrew, Arabic, Persian and English
- Verification of contact details
- Employment gaps and contradictions between the CV and public records
- In the extended check: also financial issues and conflicts of interest
- Periodic monitoring for employees in sensitive roles

How we work

- **Every finding has a link** the client can open and verify.
- **We separate people with the same name explicitly.** A finding is attributed only when more than one attribute matches.
- **Origin, nationality and religion are not counted as negative findings.** Support for a regime hostile to Israel or for a terrorist organisation is counted.
- **Every finding is reported with its context and certainty level.** The report does not recommend or disqualify; the decision stays with the employer.
- **Reports are delivered in Hebrew or English,** usually within three business days of receiving all details.

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Appendix A. The simulation queries

All queries were run on 21 October 2026 through SerpAPI's Google engine [8]. C1: pages Google dates up to 31 October 2022. C2: pages up to 20 October 2026. "About him" counts distinct results that belong to him or are about him, including the allegation posts. Google's date filter is not exact: pages without a date pass it.

#	KIND	QUERY	C1 RESULTS	C1 ABOUT HIM	C2 RESULTS	C2 ABOUT HIM	WHAT FILLED THE RESULTS
EN1	Name, English	"Sina Amjadian"	3	0	5	0	LinkedIn name directory and accounts of other people
EN2	Name, English	"Sina Amjadian" pilot	0	0	3	3	C1: no results. C2: the ShadowGraph allegation post (X and a Facebook share)
EN3	Name, English	"Sina Amjadian" flydubai	0	0	2	2	C1: no results. C2: the ShadowGraph allegation post
EN4	Name, English	"Sina Amjadian" United Airlines	1	0	10	2	C1: LinkedIn directory. C2: two of the accuser's posts; the rest other people
EN5	Name, English	"Amjadian" pilot	2	0	5	0	Other people with the same surname
EN6	Name, English	"Sina Amjadian" Iran	8	1	10	6	Both: a 2021 crew-page post naming him as a flydubai captain. C2 adds the allegation posts
EN7	Name, English	"Sina Amjadian" Israel	0	0	10	6	C1: no results. C2: the allegation posts only
FA1	Name, Persian	"سینا امجدیان"	9	0	10	0	Other people with similar names
FA2	Name, Persian	"سینا امجدیان" خلیان	9	0	9	0	Iranian military pilots and unrelated news
HD1	Username	"flywithsinaa"	10	1	4	4	His Instagram profile; at C2 also his TikTok and a Facebook reels page
HD2	Username	"SinaAmjadian"	3	0	5	0	Same as the name search: other people

#	KIND	QUERY	C1 RESULTS	C1 ABOUT HIM	C2 RESULTS	C2 ABOUT HIM	WHAT FILLED THE RESULTS
HD3	Username	"flywithsinaa" Iran OR Israel OR Gaza	8	1	9	4	His Instagram profile; at C2 also one of his X replies and the allegation posts

Sources

A. Sources checked, with findings

Sources that returned information used in this report.

- [1] [פרסום ראשון: נאסרה כניסה לישראל של טייס בחברת ענק אמריקנית](#). N12 / mako, Dean Fisher | news article, 21 Oct 2026 12:12 | accessed 2026-10-21. Local copy with SHA-256 in evidence/article.
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